Perceived Economic Pressures and Farmer Ethics by James, Harvey S. (Harvey Stanley), Jr. & Hendrickson, Mary
  
 
 
 
 
Perceived Economic Pressures and Farmer Ethics 
 
 
 
 
 
Harvey S. James, Jr. 
 
and 
 
Mary K. Hendrickson 
 
 
 
 
Department of Agricultural Economics Working Paper No. AEWP 2007-07 
 
 
 
 
August 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
The Department of Agricultural Economics is a part of the Division of Applied Social Sciences of the 
College of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources at the University of Missouri-Columbia 
200 Mumford Hall, Columbia, MO 65211 USA 
Phone: 573-882-3545 • Fax: 573-882-3958 • http://dass.missouri.edu/agecon
 
 1 
Perceived Economic Pressures and Farmer Ethics 
 
 
 
 
Harvey S. James, Jr.* 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
University of Missouri 
Mary K. Hendrickson 
Department of Rural Sociology 
University of Missouri 
 
 
 
 
August 2, 2007 
 
 
 
Abstract: We consider the effect of perceived economic pressures on the ethical attitudes of 
farmers. We hypothesize that an increase in the economic pressures a farmer faces could result in 
that farmer being more tolerant of unethical conduct than farmers not experiencing economic 
pressures. To test this hypothesis, we use data from a survey of 3,000 Missouri farmers with 
farm sales in excess of $10,000 in 2005 in which farmers were asked how acceptable they 
considered various unethical or questionable farming practices. The survey also contained 
questions designed to measure perceived economic pressures. We find evidence that economic 
pressures result in a greater willingness of farmers to tolerate unethical conduct, particularly in 
the case of actions that have the potential of causing harm or that are influenced by law or 
contract. We also find that the more frequently a farmer reports observing an unethical action, 
the more acceptable he is of it. 
 
 
 
 
Address for correspondence: Harvey James, 146 Mumford Hall, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211, USA; Phone: 573-884-9682; Fax: 
573-882-3958; Email: hjames@missouri.edu. 
 
 
 
 
*
 This project was funded by USDA National Research Initiative Agricultural Prosperity for Small and Medium 
sized Farm Program, grant number 2005-35618-15672. Previous versions of the paper were presented at the 
Agriculture, Food and Human Values Society meetings in Victoria, BC, Canada, and the American Agricultural 
Economics Association annual meetings in Portland, Oregon.
 2 
Perceived Economic Pressures and Farmer Ethics 
 
Introduction 
 There are two broad categories of ethical problems (Comstock, 2002; James, 2003). One 
consists of philosophical problems in which there is not a consensus of what is right. Examples 
in agriculture include the appropriateness of genetically modifying crops and raising animals in 
large confined feeding operations. The other occurs when people face incentives to violate 
generally accepted norms of behavior. Agricultural examples include violating food safety 
standards in food production and engaging in crop insurance fraud. This paper deals with 
behavioral problems in the context of agricultural production. Specifically, the purpose of this 
paper is to examine how perceived economic pressures affect the ethics of agricultural producers.  
 An examination of farmer ethics is important for several reasons. First, recent food safety 
scares involving E. coli contamination of spinach (Lorin, 2007) and Chinese imports of gluten 
mixed with melamine (York, 2007) have resulted in people feeling less certain about their food, 
thus reinforcing the fact that we cannot take our food for granted. Because food is such a 
necessary part of everyone’s lives and regulation of food production is imperfect, it is of 
paramount importance to society that those producing it or working in the agrifood sector have 
high ethical standards so that the food produced is safe and wholesome.  
Second, ethical behavior and adherence to basic ethical principles, such as being 
trustworthy, keeping one’s promises and not intentionally harming others, not only are necessary 
for economic growth and development generally, but also are important for understanding the 
direction and pace rural development takes. This is because “[e]thics and values as integral parts 
of our particular world views, direct everything we do, including rural development” (Lanier, 
1986, p. 122). A study of farmer ethics is timely because technological changes and industry 
consolidation occurring within the agrifood system might cause farmers to feel they need to 
engage in unethical behavior in order to survive.  
Finally, farming is often seen as a more virtuous activity than paid employment, and life 
in rural settings is often considered to be more conducive to family life than life in cities, 
economic and material realities notwithstanding (Struthers and Bokemeier, 2000). For example, 
Thompson (1998, p. 95) said the  
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current generation of adults may believe that rural residents, particularly farmers, are 
more likely to exhibit ethically praiseworthy conduct and more likely to base action and 
decision on ethical principles. In one manifestation, agrarian ideology has maintained the 
notion that farm families are more likely to be guided by principles of ethics than are 
others, and that because farming is morally significant, agriculture should be given 
special consideration in matters of public policy.  
 
 Nevertheless, “those who … farm increasingly tend to see their operations as a business 
and resent the suggestion that they should be held up as moral exemplars” (Thompson, 1998, pp. 
183-184). Thus, although the general public may believe otherwise, the ethics of farmers may 
not be that different from the ethics of men and women in non-farm businesses and may, in fact, 
be affected by similar factors, such as economic conditions (see, for instance, James, 2000). 
Research has shown that rural residents are less tolerant than urban residents of unethical 
information gathering techniques (Hallaq and Steinhorst, 1994). However, research also suggests 
that some farmers engage in unethical conduct because they believe it is in their interest to do so 
(James, 2005). Consider the following example: During the 1995-1996 grain marketing season 
when corn prices increased dramatically, many farmers committed to hedge-to-arrive contracts 
reneged on these agreements in order to minimize losses or capture the economic benefits 
associated with the rising corn prices (Baumel and Lasley, 1997).  
 Scholars have examined the values and motivations of farmers generally (Young, 
Shumway, and Goodwin, 1990; Schoon and Te Grotenhuis, 2000), as well as farmer attitudes 
towards farming (Sullivan, McCann, De Young, and Erickson, 1996). However, only one study 
has attempted to determine directly the ethics of farmers. Farm Futures magazine surveyed its 
readers to evaluate the ethical perceptions of farmers. The survey “contained information on 
perceptions of the state of farm ethics, reasons for that state, multiple ethical choice and problem 
situations, values and opinions, and personal information including church attendance, farm type, 
sales and profit levels, and current degree of satisfaction with farming” (Rappaport and 
Himschoot, 1994). The results, reported by Knorr (1991) and Rappaport and Himschoot (1994), 
show that farmers believe the ethics of agricultural producers have declined during the previous 
10 years and that “their own ethics have also deteriorated” (Knorr, 1991, p. 11). The study also 
found that “respondents believe the ethical decisions they face are more difficult than those faced 
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by an earlier generation” (Knorr, 1991, p. 11). The reasons appear to be rooted in the economic 
realities of farming. As one farmer quoted in the study said, “Ethics have always been hard to 
maintain when profit and loss become a matter of survival or going broke” (Knorr, 1991, p. 13). 
While innovative in examining the ethics of farmers, the Farm Futures study might not be 
representative of all farmers because the population from which the sample was drawn was 
subscribers to the magazine, and the study did not examine systematically whether farmer ethics 
are correlated with economic and other conditions farmers face.  
 In this paper we examine explicitly the connection between farmer ethics and economic 
conditions by exploring how economic pressures as perceived by farmers affect the ethical 
attitudes and behaviors of farmers. Our hypothesis is that there is a correlation between the 
economic pressures and a deterioration of farmer ethics. Although we examine empirically the 
ethical attitudes of farmers rather than their actual behavior, we draw on cognitive dissonance 
theory to argue that our findings have implications for farmer behavior. 
 
Background Literature  
 Although relatively little literature exists examining farmer ethics, there is a considerable 
literature examining the ethics of people in business generally. Since “it is important also to 
remember that a farmer is a businessman” (Edwards, 1991, p. 75), lessons derived from the 
business ethics literature might also apply to agricultural production.  
The causes and correlates of ethical decision-making and behavior is an extensively 
researched subject (Collins, 2000; O’Fallon and Butterfield, 2005; Treviño, Weaver and 
Reynolds, 2006). The causes of unethical conduct are complex, and no single explanation or 
theory can account for all cases of questionable conduct. However, most explanations offered as 
to why people engage in unethical behavior can be grouped into dispositional (i.e., inner 
determinant) and situational (i.e., outer determinant) factors (see Zimbardo, 2007, ch. 1; Staub, 
1978, ch. 2). Dispositional explanations focus on personality and cognitive considerations, such 
as the role of moral awareness, moral judgment, and moral intent on ethical behavior (Rest, 
1986) and on the normative frameworks people use when making moral judgments, including the 
role of emotional commitment (Frank, 1996; Elster, 1998) and self-identity (Bergman, 2004). 
Situational explanations, in contrast, focus on the context within which behavior occurs, such as 
the organizational climate (Victor and Cullen, 1988), including the incentives and disincentives 
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created by the organizational structure (James, 2000). Although ethical decision-making is 
expected to be a function of both kinds of factors, it is helpful to distinguish between 
dispositional and situational factors and the tradeoffs that often arise between the moral 
proclivities of individuals and the contextual incentives affecting their actions.  
 For example, James (2002) develops a model in which a principal must assess the relative 
temptation of an agent to exploit a principal’s trust. James shows how two major classes of 
variables affect the relative temptation of an agent to engage in an unethical action (in the case of 
the model, to exploit trust). The first class consists of environmental factors, such as the formal 
laws, informal norms, and enforcement mechanisms of society that define what is gained or lost 
when an agent behaves ethically. The idea is that from a consideration of situational or 
environmental factors only, an agent “is honest or trustworthy only if he has an incentive to be” 
(James, 2002, p. 232; emphasis in original). The second class consists of the disposition, 
proclivities and other personal characteristics of the agent. James models the tradeoff between 
incentives and one’s moral bearings to show that “the stronger are the environmental incentives 
for an agent to exploit trust, or the weaker are the agents' moral qualities, other things being 
equal, the greater will be the relative temptation the agent faces” (p. 233).  
 An important application of research on the tradeoffs between the dispositional and 
contextual forces is the examination of how business, economic and other pressures affect ethical 
decision-making. Unfortunately, empirical evidence on the effect of outside pressures is mixed. 
Butterfield, Treviño and Weaver (2000) provide evidence that, contrary to expectations, a survey 
of business professionals finds that the greater the perceived competitive environment, the more 
aware the professional are of ethical situations. Similarly, Hunt and Jennings (1997) find that 
high performance teams are more likely to make ethical decisions. However, Robertson and 
Rymon (2001) find that the more competitive the performance environment is for purchasing 
agents, as measured by perceived pressures to perform, the more likely they are to engage in 
deceptive behavior. More generally, Shleifer (2004) argues that in some circumstances economic 
competition might encourage individuals and firms to engage in unethical conduct, such as the 
use of child labor, the condoning of corrupt business practices, and the manipulation of earnings. 
However, he also argues that the same competitive forces that promote these practices also 
increase economic growth and incomes, and economic growth can lead to improved ethics, 
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because as “societies grow richer, their willingness to pay for ethical behavior – through both 
government enforcement and private choice – increases as well” (p. 10).  
 Clearly more research is needed to identify and understand factors affecting ethical 
proclivities of people generally (Treviño et al, 2006) and in the specific context of economic 
pressures, particularly when applied to agriculture. This paper contributes to the literature by 
exploring the effect of perceived economic pressures on farmer ethics.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
 We consider the class of actions in which there is a tradeoff involving money and ethics. 
Examples might include cheating on one’s taxes, utilizing low quality inputs when high quality 
was promised, dumping waste in the environment, not returning a money-filled wallet one finds 
on the road, or engaging in an activity that one finds morally objectionable because of a 
perceived material gain. These are in contrast to decisions that do not involve a money-ethics 
tradeoff. For example, there may be some circumstances in which there is a net monetary gain in 
doing the right thing (e.g., reputation for integrity increases the number of business prospects). In 
other cases, a question of ethics may not have a monetary impact (e.g., a parent lies to her child 
about the quality of the child’s artwork) or a decision to increase one’s income may not involve a 
question of ethics (e.g., a farmer chooses to sell 60 rather than 80 percent of his corn harvest).  
 We examine the relationship between perceived economic pressures and farmer ethics by 
utilizing the model developed by Hendrickson and James (2005). In their model, an agent has a 
choice that involves a money and ethics tradeoff. They show that an agent who is constrained 
from taking his most preferred action may be inclined to engage in unethical behavior. Following 
Hendrickson and James, we assume that the utility of agents is affected by their ethics, money 
wealth, and other factors, and that the utility function can be expressed according to standard 
neoclassical economic principles. If preferences are well-behaved, agents face a tradeoff in the 
ethics-money space as depicted in Figure 1. The vertical axis measures the level of the agent’s 
ethics, which we assume can be represented along a continuum. At this point we make no 
distinction between a change in ethics expressed from a behavioral perspective (e.g., lying, 
cheating or stealing) and ethics conceived as a cognitive consideration (e.g., rationalizing or 
being tolerant of lying, cheating or stealing). Let eM represent behavior that is fully ethical. For 
example, eM might represent never telling a lie, or believing it is never justifiable to return less 
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than 100 percent of the money to the owner of a lost wallet. A lower level of ethics, for instance 
at point e1, represents behavior that is less than fully ethical, such as modestly padding expense 
accounts or keeping a small fraction of money found in a lost wallet. The horizontal axis 
measures the level of money wealth held by the agent.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 If an action involves an ethics-money tradeoff, then the straight line represents the 
additional dollars gained for a given decrease in ethics or the budget constraint with respect to 
ethical behavior; we call this the agent’s ethics constraint. Thus, if an agent’s level of ethics is 
initially at point eM with a level of money at m, the gain to the agent of lowering his ethics to e1 
is to increase money wealth to m1. An agent who is fully unethical can obtain a maximum level 
of money at mM. The slope of the ethics constraint is determined by the particular circumstances 
giving rise to the disincentives reflected by the ethical dilemma. In some cases, the monetary 
gain from a given reduction in ethics may be small, while in other cases, it may be large. Cases 
in which a decision involves a question of ethics but does not result in a monetary impact are 
indicated by a vertical ethics constraint. A horizontal constraint represents actions that have only 
monetary impacts. The amount of money indicated at point m is wealth that arises from ethically 
neutral activities. Actions that result in additional wealth but at a loss of ethics are indicated by 
points on the money axis to the right of m. 
The curved line represents the agent’s indifference curve, which is the combination of 
ethics and money that produce constant utility. An increase in utility is indicated by an 
indifference curve located to the right of Utility1. The steepness of the indifference curve reflects 
in part the disposition of the agent to lower his ethics in exchange for a given increase in money. 
For agents with indifference curves that are relatively steep, a small increase in money can result 
in a large decrease in ethics. For agents who view themselves as possessing relatively high 
“morals,” in the sense that they are not easily tempted to engage in unethical conduct, the 
indifference curve might be relatively flat, suggesting that very large increases in money are 
needed to induce them to lower their ethics. Conventional neoclassical economic analysis 
predicts that given the agent’s preferences and a situation reflecting a cost of ethics as depicted in 
Figure 1, the initial level of ethics and money chosen by the agent is at point A. In other words, 
point A represents the combination of personal ethics and money wealth that maximizes the 
agent’s utility. 
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 We are interested in the effects of perceived economic pressures on the ethics of farmers. 
The most direct way that economic pressures are manifested is by an adverse shock or a sudden 
loss of wealth. In the case of agricultural production, this might occur if a storm destroys a 
farmer’s storage of grain, a contract grower routinely requires an integrator to upgrade his 
chicken barns, a farmer must unexpectedly repair a piece of expensive farm equipment, a farmer 
or member of his family requires a costly medical procedure, or a change in governmental rules 
increases the cost of compliance. In this case then there would be a leftward shift of the ethics 
constraint, as illustrated in Figure 2a, resulting in a decrease of money wealth from m1 to m’1. 
The combination of ethics e1 and money m’1 is at a utility curve that is to the left of Utility2. The 
agent could increase utility by increasing income to m2, but doing so requires a reduction in his 
personal ethics to e2, indicated at point B.  
 [Figures 2a and 2b about here] 
 A second but indirect form of economic pressure can be expressed most aptly as an 
increase in the cost of ethics (or decrease in the price of money in terms of ethics) – that is, by a 
change in the slope of the ethics constraint, as illustrated in Figure 2b. For example, an 
unexpected increase in crop prices might create an incentive for farmers committed to a futures 
contract to renege on the agreement. Similarly, more liberal crop insurance payments may create 
an increased incentive for farmers to commit crop insurance fraud. In these cases, there would be 
in a reduction in ethics as well as an increase in money earned, illustrated at point C. 
 Of course, economic pressures might reflect a combination of shifting and rotating ethics 
constraints, such as a dramatic reduction in farm prices. Regardless of the precise nature of the 
economic effect or manifestation of a reduction in ethics, this simple model reveals that 
economic pressures generally could lead agents to lower their ethics by engaging in or 
rationalizing activities that are relatively unethical, unacceptable or objectionable. This leads to 
the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: An increase in the perceived economic pressures a farmer faces will result 
in a lowering of that farmer’s ethics. 
 
The connection between (un)ethical actions and attitudes towards ethical problems 
 A change in ethics could be expressed from either a behavioral or cognitive perspective. 
Although we are particularly interested in the ethical behavior of farmers, our empirical evidence 
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(described below) measures attitudes towards ethical issues, such as an expression of being more 
tolerant or accepting of unethical conduct in others. To link ethical behavior with attitudes, we 
utilize cognitive dissonance theory introduced by Festinger (1957). According to cognitive 
dissonance theory, conflicts between a person’s beliefs and behavior create dissonance, which 
the person can reduce either by changing beliefs or behavior. If a person believes himself to be a 
good person but engages in an action he knows to be bad, the person will often modify his 
beliefs about the action, for example, by justifying the action or convincing himself the action 
was really not bad. For instance, a health-conscious person who indulges in eating chocolate may 
rationalize that behavior by noting the health benefits associated with consuming dark chocolate 
and may even begin to refer to it as a health food. (Unlike milk or white chocolate, dark 
chocolate is a potent source of antioxidants (Serafini, et al, 2003) and has been shown to lower 
high blood pressure (Taubert et al, 2003).) Importantly, “the theory of cognitive dissonance 
shows that the path between attitudes and action runs in both directions” (Tavris and Aronson, 
2007, p. 56). In other words, people who engage in unethical actions will tend to change their 
attitudes so as to view the action as less unethical, while people who are relatively tolerant of 
unethical actions would be more disposed to engage in unethical conduct than people who have 
strong opinions that the actions are wrong, other things being equal. Hence, we propose the 
following revision of hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1a: An increase in the perceived economic pressures a farmer faces will 
result in a lowering of that farmer’s ethics, manifested as an increased willingness to 
justify or rationalize unethical conduct or to express attitudes more accommodating of 
unethical conduct. 
 
According to cognitive dissonance theory, people tend to seek out information that is 
consistent with their beliefs (Frey, 1986; Nickerson, 1998). That is, they tend to accept or 
recognize information that confirms their beliefs but discount or ignore information that is 
inconsistent with their beliefs. Thus, farmers willing to tolerate unethical conduct might also be 
more likely to observe it; conversely, the more frequently a farmer admits to observing 
questionable practices, the more willing he may to view the action as relatively acceptable. This 
results in our second hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 2: An increase in the frequency a farmer reports observing an unethical 
action will result in a lowering of that farmer’s ethics, manifested as an increased 
willingness to justify or rationalize the unethical conduct or to express attitudes more 
accommodating of the unethical conduct. 
 
 In summary, if we obtain information on farmer attitudes towards various ethical 
scenarios, we expect to find that a negative relationship between perceived economic pressures 
and the ethics of farmers, other things being equal. We also expect to observe a negative 
correlation between the stated frequency of observing unethical actions within the community 
and our measure of farmer ethics. 
 
Methods and Procedures 
 We surveyed a sample of 3,000 agricultural producers from the population of Missouri 
(USA) producers with farm sales in excess of $10,000 in 2005. According to USDA data, 41 
percent of all Missouri farms had sales in 2005 exceeding $10,000. The sample was stratified by 
size to ensure a statistically representative sample across size categories. The survey design 
consisted of a heads-up postcard followed by two waves of surveys. We mailed the first wave of 
surveys in late February 2006, with a second mailing to non-respondents completed in March 
2006. Of the 2,941 surveys that were deliverable, we received 692 responses, representing an 
overall response rate of 23.5 percent. This response rate is not unusual for surveys mailed to 
farmers early in the calendar year (see Pennings, Irwin, and Good, 2002). We asked farmers for 
their opinions on a variety of ethical scenarios, how satisfied they were with their life and 
financial situation, as well as about their personal and farming backgrounds. The average 
respondent in our sample farmed approximately 940 acres, had 31 years of farming experience, 
and had sales in 2005 of between $50,000 and $250,000. For this study we focus only on 
respondents who were active producers, thus excluding landowners and retired farmers. 
Removing observations with missing variables resulted in a sample size of about 400.  
 We operationalize ethical attitudes from responses given to a series of 16 different ethical 
scenarios that might arise within an agricultural or rural setting. For each scenario, we asked 
respondents to answer two questions. First, we asked them to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale 
(where 1 represents acceptable and a 7 represents unacceptable) “the degree to which you believe 
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the activity is acceptable or unacceptable.” Second, we asked respondents to indicate on a 5-
point Likert scale (where 1 represents never occurs and a 5 represents always occurs) “whether 
you think the scenario never or always occurs in your community, or something in between.” 
Table 1 lists each scenario, along with the average ethic (range 1-7) and average perceived 
frequency that action occurs (range 1-5).  
[Table 1 about here] 
 We assume that each scenario represents an unethical action. We also assume a response 
towards the “acceptable” (i.e., lower) end of the scale represents a greater tolerance for the 
unethical action, whereas a response towards the “unacceptable” (i.e., higher) end of the scale 
represents a greater intolerance for the unethical action, which we define as indicating a higher 
level of ethics. In other words, we assume responses to these ethical scenarios can be interpreted 
as follows: Other things being equal, if one producer’s belief that a particular ethical scenario is 
relatively unacceptable (e.g., he scores the action as a 6 on the acceptable to unacceptable scale 
of 1 to 7), while another producer believes the same scenario is relatively acceptable (e.g., she 
scores the action as a 3), then we say the attitudes of the first producer are more consistent with a 
higher level of ethics than those of the second producer.  
 We use principal component analysis with varimax rotation to identify underlying 
dimensions of ethical attitudes giving rise to the responses to the 16 ethical scenarios. This 
analysis resulted in three eigenvalues that were greater than one, suggesting that we focus on 
three underlying dimensions. We accepted scale items with factors loadings greater than 0.40 in 
our interpretation of the underlying dimensions, which are listed in Table 1 according to how 
they grouped in each of the three dimensions. Only one of the 16 scale items did not group into 
any of the three underlying dimensions (i.e., it had a factor loading less than 0.40 for each 
dimension), while two items were grouped into two of the three dimensions. Cronbach alphas for 
the first two component dimensions exceed the customary limit of 0.70 (alphas of 0.76 and 0.73 
respectively), while the third factor has a Cronbach alpha of just under that level (alpha of 0.66). 
One possible reason for the low Cronbach alpha of the third dimension is that the components 
represent an amalgam of ethical scenarios that are too dissimilar to be influenced by one 
construct. Because the Cronbach alpha for the third dimension is less than 0.70, we recognize 
that caution must be exercised in our use of this indicator. 
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 The first dimension consists of seven individual scale items. Interestingly, each of these 
items reflects a scenario in which physical or financial harm could befall some members of 
society as a result of the unethical action. For example, the scale items with the largest loadings 
are continuing to use herbicides that are found in community wells, mixing low quality with high 
quality grain, and telling a buyer that crops are organic when in fact chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides were use. For this reason, we identify this dimension as ethical problems that are 
“Harmful.” The second dimension consists of five scale items, which reflect issues of right or 
wrong as determined by law or contract. For example, the factors with the largest loadings are 
failing to report a rebate as income, claiming depreciation for a truck used by other family 
members, and brown bagging genetically-modified seed in violation of licensing requirements. 
Therefore, we identify this dimension as ethical problems that are “Unlawful.” The third 
dimension consists of factors that are not necessarily harmful or illegal; rather, they are examples 
of practices that some people may consider merely inappropriate or “Bad Form,” hence the name 
for this grouping.  
 We constructed our ethics variables by summing the scale items identified for each of the 
three underlying components weighted by their respective factor loadings. Thus, the variable 
Harmful is the sum of the seven individual scale items identified from the principal component 
analysis weighted by each item’s factor loading. The variables Unlawful and Bad Form are 
created by summing the weighted five scale items identified for these two groupings 
respectively. Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations and ranges for these variables (as 
well as for all variables used in our analysis). We assume that the higher the values of Harmful, 
Unlawful and Bad Form, respectively, the greater are the respondent’s ethics for each dimension 
(or, conversely, the less tolerant or accepting a farmer is of the collection of scenarios 
comprising the construct). 
[Table 2 about here] 
 Because we expect that there is not a single measure of economic pressure, we consider 
different ways in which pressures might be felt or manifested. To this end, we operationalize 
economic pressure from responses given to the following three questions: 
How impossible is it to make a living if farmers followed all government rules and 
regulations? We expect that farmers who believe it is difficult or impossible to follow all rules 
and regulations may be inclined to rationalize unethical conduct. To test this hypothesis, we use 
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the following question asked in the Farm Futures survey reported by Knorr (1991). “It would be 
impossible to make a living if farmers followed all government rules and regulations.” 
Respondents were asked to select one of the following options: strongly disagree, somewhat 
disagree, neutral, somewhat agree, strongly agree, and don’t know. We expect a negative 
relationship between this variable and our measures of farmer ethics.  
How much freedom of choice and control do farmers feel they have over the way their life 
turns out? Farmers who feel considerable economic pressures may also feel that they have little 
free choice and control in their lives. Therefore, we expect that farmers who believe they have 
freedom and choice and control will be less likely to rationalize or condone unethical conduct. 
To test this hypothesis we use the following question taken from the World Values Survey (see 
Inglehart, et al, 2005): “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their 
lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Using 
the scale from 1 to 10, indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over 
the way your life turns out.” We expect a positive relationship between this variable and farmer 
ethics.  
How satisfied are farmers with the financial situation of their households? Farmers who 
face considerable economic pressures may not be as satisfied with their household finances as 
farmers not constrained by economic factors. To test this relationship, we use another question 
derived from the World Values Survey: “How satisfied are you with the financial situation of 
your household? Using the following scale [from 1 to 10], indicate where you would put your 
satisfaction with your household’s financial situation.” We expect a positive relationship 
between this variable and our measures of farmer ethics.  
Definitions and summary statistics for these explanatory variables as well as control 
variables are given in table 2. We control for farm size, whether farmers raise animals, the age of 
the farmer, the farmer’s religiosity, and farmer gender. Regarding farm size, there is some 
evidence that in smaller firms workers are more ethically sensitive than workers in larger firms 
(see Collins, 2000). However, more recent research suggests firm size is not an important factor 
in ethical decision-making (see O’Fallon and Butterfield, 2005), suggesting that there may not be 
significant differences between small and large farms. We have no a priori expectation of how 
production of animals will affect farmer ethics, although it is possible that farmers who raise 
farm animals might be more sensitive to issues of harm, particularly as they relate to or are 
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affected by their animals. The effect of age is ambiguous, while religiosity is generally positively 
related to ethical proclivities (O’Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). When differences are identified, 
women tend to express higher levels of ethical sensitivity than men (Collins, 2000).  
 The econometric specification of our model is as follows:  
ErrorTermiablesControlVard
FrequencycPerceivedableessureVariPrbEconomicacsFarmerEthi
k
ik ++
++=
∑                                             
0
 
We estimate this equation using a Tobit (censored regression) model, because the dependent 
variable has arbitrarily censored low and high values. Marginal effects of a change in the 
dependent variable for a given unit change in an independent variable are calculated by 
multiplying the estimated coefficient times the probability that the dependent variable lies within 
the range of minimum and maximum values (see Greene, 2000, ch. 20). 
 
Results 
 Of the scenarios listed in Table 1, the actions that farmers considered to be the most 
unethical, as defined by a perceived “unacceptable” value of 6 or 7, are planting part of a field 
but claiming crop damage to the entire field, telling buyers that crops are organic when they are 
not, continuing to use herbicides that are found to seep into water wells, and claiming that a 
mixture of low and high quality grain is high quality. More than 70 percent of respondents 
scored each of these scenarios as either a 6 or 7 on the 7-point Likert scale, suggesting a 
relatively strong consensus that these actions are unacceptable. In contrast, several scenarios 
listed in Table 1 had low percentages of respondents indicating the actions as either a 6 or 7, 
suggesting a relative tolerance for the action or lack of consensus that the action is unethical. 
Examples include forcing a farmer to fulfill a forward contract at a loss, decreasing cage space 
for poultry, withholding roughage from veil calves, and outbidding a neighbor on rental 
farmland.  
Generally, those actions that farmers considered to be the most unethical, as measured by 
the percent of respondents coding the action as either a 6 or 7, were those that had the potential 
of causing harm (i.e., were elements of the Harmful component), although there is a range in the 
consensus of how unacceptable the items are (e.g., in the case of Harmful actions, the percent 
indicating 6 or 7 ranges from nearly 80 to about 42 percent). The average percent of respondents 
reporting a 6 or 7 for the items grouped as Harmful is 65.5 percent. For the items grouped as 
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Unlawful, the average percent of respondents indicating a 6 or 7 is 54.6 percent. Actions that 
tended to be the most tolerable in terms of the mean ethics rank, however, tended to group into 
the Bad Form component; the average percent of respondents reporting a 6 or 7 for these items is 
34 percent. Thus, there seems to be a relative progression in terms of how respondents perceive 
the acceptability of various ethical dilemmas. Harmful actions are judged to be more unethical 
than Unlawful ones, on average, which tend to be perceived as more unethical than Bad Form 
actions.  
 The table of correlations (Table 3) shows that our measures of economic pressures are 
correlated with the Harmful, Unlawful and Bad Form measures of farmer ethics. The signs for 
Harmful and Unlawful indices are negative for the impossible rules measure and positive for the 
control over life and satisfaction with finances measure, consistent with our first hypothesis. 
Interestingly, the signs for the Bad Form index are contrary to expectations. There is also a 
significant and negative correlation between perceived frequency of each construct and the level 
of ethics. Considering all 16 ethical scenarios together, the correlation between mean ethic and 
perceived frequency is -0.61, suggesting that the more frequently a farmer believes the action 
occurs, the more tolerant he or she is of the action, consistent with our second hypothesis. 
 [Table 3 about here] 
 Tables 4a and 4b present the results of the Tobit analysis, controlling for farm and farmer 
characteristics, in which the dependent variable is the first two composite ethics variables created 
as a result of the principal component analysis, Harmful and Unlawful. We omit the analysis for 
the Bad Form composite because the low Cronbach alpha suggests the individuals items 
comprising the composite are too dissimilar. In the case of ethical problems that are harmful and 
unlawful, the effect of economic pressures is as predicted. The more impossible farmers feel it is 
to follow all government rules and regulations, the more tolerant they are of unethical actions 
that are harmful and unlawful (i.e., the lower their level of ethics, as indicated by the negative 
coefficient). Farmers who feel they have control over their lives and farmers who are satisfied 
with their finances indicate that the ethical problems are more unacceptable. By implication, 
farmers who believe they have less control over their lives or who are less satisfied with their 
finances are relatively more accepting of the unethical practices embodying the Harmful and 
Unlawful constructs.  
 [Tables 4a and 4b about here] 
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 The relationship between perceived frequency of occurrence and our measures of farmer 
ethics is as expected, except the effect is not significant in the case of harmful actions. We also 
find that farmers who raise animals have higher levels of ethics when ethical issues involve 
harm, but the presence of animals on the farm does not appear to significantly affect attitudes 
towards unlawful problems. Age is positively correlated with farmer ethics that result in harm 
and are unlawful. Generally, male farmers are more accepting of unethical actions than female 
farmers, although the significance disappears for unlawful problems. Religious activity has a 
positive effect on harmful and unlawful actions, but the effect is significant only in the case of 
unlawful scenarios. Finally, we find no significant effect of farm size on farmer ethics.  
 
Commentary 
We find that there is a relatively strong consensus among respondents that situations 
resulting in harm are more unacceptable than those that are wrong because they are defined so by 
law or contract or because they are socially inappropriate. Not surprisingly, this suggests that 
farmers recognize that not all ethical problems are the same and that some are more serious (i.e., 
unacceptable) than others. We also find evidence that perceived economic pressures are 
correlated with a greater willingness of farmers to tolerate unethical conduct and that the more 
common a respondent believes an action is in his community, the more accommodating he is of 
it. Interestingly, the relationship between perceived economic pressures and farmer ethics is 
reversed for actions that are ethically questionable but are not necessarily harmful or unlawful.  
That a negative correlation exists between perceived economic pressures and farmer 
ethics involving issues of harm and the law or contract suggests that farmers may be willing to 
consider the tradeoffs that arise by causing harm or violating the law.  We can only speculate on 
what farmers believe the costs are, particularly those he is willing to internalize, when 
rationalizing his beliefs. For example, in the case of causing harm or violating the law, the cost to 
the farmer when “caught” might be the payment of compensatory, civil or even criminal 
damages. If farmers consider only these types of costs when deciding whether to engage in or 
condone unethical actions without a consideration of the larger impacts on society of their 
actions, then balancing the costs and benefits of actions that are harmful or unlawful would 
involve relatively standard economic considerations. In the case of ethically-questionable actions 
that do not readily fit into the harm or law/contract categories, enforcement of the ethical 
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standards may not involve strictly economic considerations. It could be that “bad form” problems 
are enforced by the community or by community norms and therefore these farmers feel they 
have to conform to be part of a community. Harmful or unlawful scenarios, in contrast, are 
enforced by the “outside” in most cases and probably matter only if one is caught.  
Another consideration is that there is significant attention regarding the corporate social 
responsibility of business firms, including firms within the agrifood industry (Maloni and Brown, 
2006). Corporate social responsibility refers to the expectations stakeholders place on the actions 
of a corporation. Stakeholders include not only stockholders but also employees, suppliers, 
consumers and other groups with an interest in how a firm performs. In the case of agribusiness 
firms, the dimensions that one might consider from a corporate social responsibility framework 
include concerns regarding animal welfare, biotechnology, health and safety, fair trade and other 
issues (Maloni and Brown, 2006). While most discussions of corporate social responsibility 
focus on the responsibility of the (agri)business firm, Goodstein and Wicks (2007) argue that 
business ethics requires a two-way communication with emphasis placed not only on the actions 
of the business firm but also on the actions of suppliers, customers and other stakeholders, 
because different stakeholders have different “regimes of responsibility.” To this end, our study 
highlights the importance of considering the ethics of farmers qua agribusiness stakeholders in 
addition to that of agribusiness firms acting as downstream consumers of the inputs provided by 
agricultural producers. Similarly, there is increasing interest in food products that are produced 
in ethical ways (i.e. protections for farmworkers, fair compensation through the food chain, fair 
trade, humane treatment of animals, etc.). If ethical attitudes and behavior are related, as 
postulated by cognitive dissonance theory, then will farmers be willing or able to take advantage 
of these opportunities if they are tolerant of, and possibly resorting to, less ethical practices 
because of perceived economic pressures? While participating in these new market niches may 
increase ethical attitudes and behavior on the part of farmers, they may be as likely to exclude 
certain farmers from participation based on their economic situation. 
 The larger implication of these findings may be in how we choose to develop and 
implement policies relating to agriculture, food and the environment. Rules that place constraints 
on or that increase substantially the pressures farmers feel might exacerbate certain kinds of 
ethical problems, since farmers could respond to these rules by, over time, becoming more 
tolerant or accepting of unethical practices. Farming has the potential to have a very important 
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impact on environmental questions – clean air, clean water – and farming practices are some of 
the first points of intervention in achieving these public goods. In addition, more and more food 
safety issues (e.g. animal disease, fecal contamination, foodborne pathogens) are arising directly 
at the point of production. Understanding the situational components that influence ethical 
attitudes, and thereby ethical behavior, becomes a necessity in ensuring society’s access to good, 
safe food, clean water and clean air. If farmers feel tremendous economic pressures and loss of 
autonomy and thus have a higher tolerance for some ethically questionable situations, then it 
may be wise for society as a whole to work to alleviate these pressures in order to achieve our 
desired public goods. In other words, society can develop and enforce regulations that promote 
the kinds of public goods it wants, but it might do as much good to find ways to alleviate 
financial pressures on farmers in order to get the same results. While we don’t have evidence that 
farmers are treating the land, animals or the food they produce badly from this survey, we do 
provide a context for the way they may be thinking about these issues. Accordingly, we believe it 
is very important for scholars, policy makers and community leaders to understand the context 
within which farming occurs and to consider how situational factors and the environment within 
which agricultural production occurs affect the ethical attitudes and behaviors of farmers in order 
to develop policies that will achieve desired public goods. 
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Table 1. Ethical scenarios with composite scales from principal component analysis. 
 
Component Scale items Mean ethic (scale 1-7) 
Percent 
indicating 
6 or 7 
Mean freq 
(scale 1-5) 
Factor 
loading 
Corr 
with 
total 
       
Harmful 
C.α = 0.76 
A farmer plants only a part of a field and later 
suffers crop damage, but he files a crop insurance 
claim on the entire field.* 
6.429 79.7 2.793 0.5386 0.49 
 A farmer tells buyers his crops are organic even 
though some chemical fertilizers and pesticides 
were used.† 
6.355 77.4 2.750 0.6205 0.51 
 A farmer continues using an herbicide, even though 
traces of it have begun to show up in wells in his 
community.† 
6.147 72.8 2.768 0.7023 0.48 
 A distributor mixes cheap, low-quality grain with 
high-grade grain and labels the product as 100% 
top-grade grain. 
6.123 71.5 3.190 0.6786 0.43 
 A farmer disposes of pesticide containers without 
rinsing them as required by law.* , † 
5.841 62.1 2.985 0.5330 0.53 
 A farmer applies a pesticide in windy conditions in 
order to keep to a production schedule.  
5.546 53.6 3.063 0.5977 0.48 
 A corn farmer fails to maintain a proper refuge 
between genetically modified (GM) and non-GM 
corn. 
 
5.119 41.6 2.959 0.5461 0.43 
Unlawful 
C.α = 0.73 
A farmer plants only a part of a field and later 
suffers crop damage, but he files a crop insurance 
claim on the entire field.* 
6.429 79.7 2.793 0.4147 0.56 
 A farmer disposes of pesticide containers without 
rinsing them as required by law.* , † 
5.841 62.1 2.985 0.4164 0.57 
 A farmer growing a genetically-modified crop 
retains part of his harvest as seed in violation of the 
licensing requirements of the seed supplier. 
5.327 53.0 2.697 0.5989 0.46 
 A rancher claims business depreciation on a pickup 
truck used primarily by other members of his 
family.† 
4.912 39.7 3.315 0.7827 0.50 
 A farmer fails to report a $100 herbicide rebate as 
income to the IRS.† 
 
4.761 38.3 3.180 0.7982 0.44 
Bad Form 
C.α = 0.66  
A bank forecloses on a farm loan without first 
offering to reduce the interest or principal owed.† 
4.911 44.5 3.123 0.6385 0.39 
 A farmer outbids a second farmer on rental 
farmland, even though the second farmer has 
farmed that land for years. 
4.486 36.6 3.651 0.7334 0.48 
 A producer withholds all roughage from the diet of 
his veal calf in order to improve the quality of the 
veal meat.† 
4.748 32.5 2.844 0.4815 0.44 
 A grower decreases the amount of room he 
provides for his laying hens in order to cut costs 
and increase production.  
4.660 29.0 2.911 0.4030 0.40 
 A grain elevator forces a farmer to fulfill a forward 
contract by buying grain from the market at a loss, 
even though drought caused the farmer’s yields to 
be low.† 
 
4.070 27.5 3.352 0.7924 0.33 
None A dairy farmer knowingly hires illegal aliens for 
his milking crew in order to keep costs low. 
5.307 51.2 3.054 n/a n/a 
Note: For Mean ethic and Mean frequency, a higher value indicates perceived less acceptable and more common, 
respectively. C.α refers to Cronbach alpha. * Same scale item in Harmful and Unlawful component. † These 
scenarios are, with permission, taken or adapted from the Farm Futures survey reported by Knorr (1991). 
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Table 2. Variable names and summary statistics. 
 
Variables and Definitions Mean St. Dev 
Dependent Variables: Each variable is the sum of individual scale items identified from 
principal component analysis of respondent attitudes towards different ethical 
scenarios, with responses to each item ranging from 1 (acceptable) to 7 (unacceptable)  
  
Harmful: Sum of 7 ethical scale items related by the fact that the action could result in 
harm, weighted by factor loading (ranging from 7.2 to 29.5). 
25.080 3.558 
Unlawful: Sum of 5 ethical scale items related as actions that are either prohibited by 
law or contract, weighted by factor loadings (ranging from 3.0 to 21.2). 
15.892 3.692 
Bad Form: Sum of 5 ethical scale items reflecting cases that could be interpreted as 
being undesirable, though not necessarily illegal or harmful, weighted by factor loading 
(ranging from 3.0 to 21.3). 
13.803 3.9468 
   
Explanatory and Control Variables   
Frequency observed: How frequently respondent believes each ethical scenario occurs 
in their community, with responses ranging from 1 (never occurs) to 5 (always occurs). 
_Harmful: Weighted sum of 7 responses for Harmful scale items. 
_Unlawful: Weighted sum of 5 responses for Unlawful scale items. 
_Bad Form: Weighted sum of 5 responses for Bad Form scale items. 
 
 
12.375 
9.181 
9.878 
 
 
2.521 
2.059 
1.794 
Impossible rules: Likert scale variable for question, “It would be impossible to make a 
living if farmers followed all government rules and regulations,” ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).†  
3.077 1.251 
Control over life: Likert scale variable for question, “How much freedom of choice 
and control do you feel you have over the way your life turns out?” ranging from 1 
(none at all) to 10 (a great deal).‡ 
7.851 2.018 
Satisfied with finances: Likert scale variable for question, “How satisfied are you with 
the financial situation of your household?” ranging from 1 (extremely dissatisfied) to 
10 (extremely satisfied).‡ 
6.545 2.415 
Larger than average farm: Dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent had a farm size 
greater than the average of 940 acres in the sample; zero otherwise. 
0.301 0.459 
Farm animals: Dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent raised at least one of the 
following farm animals: hogs, beef, dairy, goats, or poultry; zero otherwise. 
0.771 0.421 
Age category: Respondent’s age, where 1=less than 35, 2=35 to 44, 3=45 to 54, 4=55 
to 64, 6=65 and older 
3.515 1.149 
Active in church: Dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent attended church at least 
once a month; zero otherwise. 
0.634 0.482 
Male: Dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent is a male; zero otherwise. 0.942 0.234 
   
†Adapted from the Farm Futures survey reported by Knorr (1991). ‡Adapted from the World Values Survey (see 
Inglehart, 2005). 
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Table 3. Correlations. 
 
Variable D1 D2 D3 Y1 Y2 Y3 X1 X2 X3 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
               
Harmful (D1) 1.00              
Unlawful (D2) 0.58 1.00             
Bad form (D3) 0.29 0.21 1.00            
Frequency_Harmful (Y1) -0.09 -0.19 -0.09 1.00           
Frequency_Unlawful (Y2) -0.01 -0.20 -0.15 0.73 1.00          
Frequency_Bad Form (Y3) -0.09 -0.15 -0.10 0.53 0.48 1.00         
Impossible rules (X1) -0.13 -0.13 0.10 0.17 0.08 0.06 1.00        
Control over life (X2) 0.20 0.13 -0.06 -0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.16 1.00       
Satisfied with finances (X3) 0.07 0.18 -0.18 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 -0.04 0.50 1.00      
Larger than average farm (C1) -0.03 0.04 0.09 -0.16 -0.17 0.07 -0.13 0.09 0.01 1.00     
Farm animals (C2) 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.11 -0.27 1.00    
Age category (C3) 0.18 0.15 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.18 -0.11 0.09 1.00   
Active in church (C4) 0.05 0.10 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 0.12 0.14 0.05 -0.00 0.02 1.00  
Male (C5) -0.12 -0.02 -0.12 -0.10 -0.06 -0.10 -0.04 0.04 0.07 0.11 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 1.00 
               
Bold indicates significant at 5%; italics indicates significant at 10%  
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Table 4a. Tobit analysis of factors affecting ethical variable Harmful. 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 27.162*** 
(1.783) 
 
23.02*** 
(1.699) 
 
25.992*** 
(1.590) 
 
Impossible rules 
-0.426*** 
(0.163) 
 
  
Control over life  0.427*** 
(0.095) 
 
 
Satisfied with finances   0.136* 
(0.080) 
 
Frequency observed 
 _Harmful 
-0.077 
(0.083) 
 
-0.103 
(0.073) 
 
-0.120 
(0.075) 
 
Larger than average 
farm 
-0.086 
(0.442) 
 
-0.183 
(0.407) 
 
-0.018 
(0.416) 
 
Farm animals 1.085** 
(0.470) 
 
1.037** 
(0.438) 
 
1.211*** 
(0.451) 
 
Age category 0.549*** 
(0.179) 
 
0.480*** 
(0.160) 
 
0.385** 
(0.166) 
 
Active in church 0.535 
(0.411) 
 
0.305 
(0.372) 
 
0.403 
(0.381) 
 
Male 
-2.828*** 
(1.039) 
 
-2.631*** 
(0.893) 
 
-2.862*** 
(0.920) 
 
Σ 3.615*** 
(0.147) 
 
3.544*** 
(0.133) 
 
3.628*** 
(0.136) 
 
N 343 406 405 
Num obs at 
lower bound 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
Num obs at  
upper bound 
 
28 
 
34 
 
34 
Prob 
(lower<Harmful<upper) 
 
91.5% 
 
91.4% 
 
91.4% 
Log Likelihood -881.2 -1034 -1040 
Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects calculated by multiplying estimated coefficient with probability the 
dependent variable is within the upper and lower bound range. 
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
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Table 4b. Tobit analysis of factors affecting ethical variable Unlawful. 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 19.798*** 
(1.699) 
 
14.042*** 
(1.624) 
 
15.525*** 
(1.489) 
 
Impossible rules 
-0.444*** 
(0.169) 
 
  
Control over life  0.376*** 
(0.101) 
 
 
Satisfied with finances   0.267*** 
(0.082) 
 
Frequency observed 
 _Unlawful 
-0.340*** 
(0.103) 
 
-0.338*** 
(0.094) 
 
-0.336*** 
(0.095) 
 
Larger than average 
farm 
0.063 
(0.466) 
 
0.095 
(0.436) 
 
0.291 
(0.436) 
 
Farm animals 0.124 
(0.463) 
 
0.236 
(0.468) 
 
0.284 
(0.472) 
 
Age category 0.498*** 
(0.184) 
 
0.560*** 
(0.166) 
 
0.487*** 
(0.168) 
 
Active in church 0.642 
(0.429) 
 
0.864** 
(0.393) 
 
0.931** 
(0.394) 
 
Male -1.576 
(0.992) 
 
-0.584 
(0.807) 
 
-0.745 
(0.812) 
 
Σ 3.866*** 
(0.155) 
 
3.846*** 
(0.142) 
 
3.856*** 
(0.143) 
 
N 361 429 428 
Num obs at 
lower bound 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
Num obs at  
upper bound 
 
34 
 
44 
 
44 
Prob 
(lower<Unlawful<upper) 
 
90.3% 
 
89.5% 
 
89.5% 
Log Likelihood -944.0 -1113 -1111 
Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects calculated by multiplying estimated coefficient with probability the 
dependent variable is within the upper and lower bound range. 
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
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Figure 1. The tradeoff between ethics and money, based on Hendrickson and James (2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2a. How a sudden loss of wealth, 
represented by the leftward shift of the ethics 
constraint, results in a reduction in ethics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2b. How a change in the cost of ethics, 
represented by a rotation of the ethics constraint, 
results in a reduction in ethics. 
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